

REMARKS
ON THE
BUDGET;
OR, A
CANDID EXAMINATION
OF THE
FACTS and ARGUMENTS
Offered to the PUBLIC in that
PAMPHLET.

*Peras duas;
Propriis repletam vitiis, post Tergum dedit
Alienis ante pectus suspendit gravem.*

PHÆD.



L O N D O N:

Printed for J. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church-Yard; and
may be had at the Pamphlet-Shops at the Royal-Ex-
change, and Charing-Cross. 1765.

[Price Six-pence.]

THE M. A. R. K. 3

B. U. D. G. E. T.

OR A

STANDARD EXAMINATION

QUESTIONS

FACTS and ARGUMENTS



REMARKS

ON THE

BUDGET.

WHEN I first heard of the Pamphlet, intitled the *Budget*, and of the Applause with which it had been received, I considered it as one of those Antiministerial Pieces that never fail of success in this Country, in a time of Peace, let the Minister or his Measures, be who, or what they will; and which for the most part, deserve very little the Attention of a sober Man, that has Business of his own to mind, and who only wishes the prosperity of his Country, without views of Self-Interest, or the desire of gratifying the Malevolence of Party.

But when upon a perusal of this artful Performance, I found it to be an attack on Public Credit, by an Author, who, while he charges the Ministry with proclaiming our distress, is not ashamed of endeavouring to increase it, by most inaccurate, if not *wilfull* Misrepresentations; I could not but hope, these would be speedily pointed out, and when I was informed, from all quarters, of its mischievous Effects; when I heard that the Contents,

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and the Pamphlet itself, had been circulated with diligence, not only in this Country, but in *Holland*; and that a Set of Men in *England* gloried in their having convinced the *Dutch*, that it was better to make a Two per Cent. in their own Country, than to lay out their Money in the *English* Funds; I thought it my Duty, to make such Observations as have occurred to me, and which I am persuaded, have occurred to every Man, that does not choose to admit the Truth of Calculations, and Conclusions, rather than beat the Trouble of examining them.

And though perhaps I might safely undertake to confute all the Charges the Author has made against the Administration, and might support their justification on Facts, notorious to every one; though I am convinced, that their Conduct will not suffer in the comparison an Hundred Years hence, with that of any of their Predecessors, I shall take no other Notice of them than as they are necessarily blended with my Design, which is to inquire how far our Author's Materials warrant the conclusion he has drawn to the Detriment of Public Credit, and to throw in occasionally such Lights, as Public and undoubted Materials have afforded me.

To pursue the method adopted by the *Budget*, I confess, I cannot for my Life find out upon what pretence he would persuade us to believe, that a very large Sum of * the unfortunate Debt, contracted in the last War, has not been paid off out of the Supplies of the Current Year: that every part of the 2,771,867*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* is a Debt, and a Debt too contracted to our misfortune in the late War, is a Fact, not to be denied; nor is it in fact denied by this Author; but he is pleased to say, these

* *Budget*, p. 4.

these are * *Articles provided for as they arise*; doubtless if a Debt be paid when it is liquidated, it may be said, to be provided for as it arises; but is it less a Debt, or is the time of Contracting it altered; the Question is not whether these are *pompously* called Debts, but whether they are *truly* so? Is there a single Item comprised in the above Sum, that probably would have existed a Demand on the Public, had we not been engaged in the late War, unless it be the Deficiency of the Land and Malt? And even half the Land Tax Deficiency may properly be considered as a War Deficiency; because the Rate of that Tax is a consequence of the late War. But as I confess Deficiencies of Funds and Grants are ordinarily thrown upon the succeeding Year; and as our Author in effect, acknowledges he has no other Objection to those Items being called Debts, but his *Argument ad Homines*, it may be necessary to examine how far that Argument goes. Deficiencies in 1764, will certainly be left for Payment in 1765, as they have been ever since the Revolution; and though these Deficiencies would not probably have amounted to 200,000*l.* but in consequence of the late War; at least we have the Satisfaction to find 2,187,434*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* of the War Debt paid, exclusive of the Sum advanced in Consequence of Addresses, and of all the Deficiencies that can occur in time of Peace.

But says our Author, there is not enough of the Debt paid: † 1,500,000*l.* used to be provided for the Navy Debt, now thrown and kept upon the Sinking Fund: I would ask, what was this Provision but a Fallacy, while the Navy every Year ran in Debt almost twice as much as was provided to discharge the former Debt? And who is to be blamed, those who incurred this Debt, or those

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who

* *Budget*, p. 5. † p. 6.

who have destined for the Payment of it what is appropriated by it's Nature for the Payment of the Public Debt, and is, I trust, amply sufficient with Care and Oeconomy to effect it.

That our Army Establishment is at first Sight more than on an Average of the late Peace is not to be denied; but the Number, and even Expence of the Army in *Great Britain* is evidently less; and if by the Addition of an immense Territory in *North America*, and a very valuable one in the *West Indies*, by an Expence necessarily greater in Half-pay and at *Chelsea* Hospital, as well as by that constitutional Increase of Force the Militia, the Amount of the whole be swelled a little beyond former Peace Establishments, we have all the reason in the World to hope the Burthen will be well compensated both in Profit and Security, and that it will grow lighter every Day, besides the fair Prospect we have of being disburthened of a very considerable part of that in the Plantations, without losing any part of the Profit resulting from our Possessions there.

The additional Number of Officers is a very small Expence to a Nation that has a large Half-pay List *; surely an annual Sum of about 40, or 50000 is well employed in keeping 6 or 700 brave Officers ready for actual Service, and enabling us at a short Warning to double our Force, and thereby in procuring for us a Security against a

* In Justification of this Measure I might cite the Opinion of a wise and honest, as well as eloquent Member of the House of Commons, who has declared his Opinion, that the Corps should have been smaller, and a Number of Officers entertained in Pay greater still than they are; I mention this as an *Argument ad Homines*; for though I confess myself not disposed to acquiesce in all the Opinions of this great Man, the Author and his Friends will hardly dispute them.

future War, that we can derive from nothing but a Readiness to enter into it. Is a Peace to be called * *hollow*, and deemed unlikely to be *permanent*, because it is thought wise to be prepared for War? Is any part of the Army in time of Peace kept up with any other view? I know of no other Use it is of; I should think myself uncandid if I accused the Author and his Friends of deeming it fit for any other; but if 16,000 Men can be made for this purpose nearly equal to 30,000, by a Measure, which in our Situation at the End of a War is practicable by an Expence of about 125,000*l.* can it be doubted a Moment, that it is preferable to subsidising at the Expence of 2 or 300,000*l.* a Year? And which is to be deemed a hollow Peace, that which the Author's Friends think requires the Support of such Subsidies (to Princes who have too frequently deserted us in time of actual War, or disabled themselves from performing their Engagements, by preferring the Objects of their own restless Ambition) or one that requires no other than 40 or 50000*l.* spent in keeping from Retirement 6 or 700 gallant Officers, accustomed for many Years to beat our Enemies.

But because I consider myself as an Advocate for the Public Credit, and so much Pains have been taken to decry it, under a Pretext that we are at the Eve of another War, after a short and hollow Peace; I cannot think I go out of my way by stating how this matter appears to me upon the Consideration of Facts known to all Mankind, without pretending to the Knowledge of the Secrets of Princes, or of the Biass their Measures may receive from their own Caprice, or that of their Ministers. I pretend only to judge on the usual and ordinary Incitements to Peace and War.

Secrets

Secrets are out of my Knowledge, and fortuitous Events are out of the Reach of Prediction.

It seems a false Notion, too readily admitted by People of every Nation, that whatever its Neighbours get they lose themselves; that all Acquisitions and Cessions of Territory and Trade, are Acquisitions of Power and Strength; but surely this maxim is not true; and experience has a Thousand times proved it utterly false.

Every Acquisition of Territory or Trade, that puts a People in the power of another, is Weakness in the former, and Strength and Security against War in the latter. It is in this light, that I see every Cession by the Peace to our late Enemies.

The Trade of the *French* and *Spanish West Indies*, is notoriously in our power, the Moment War is declared; that Trade long use has made so necessary to their internal prosperity, that the stopping it for a time, cannot but produce a great Disorder in every part of their Political Œconomy. The Fishery of the *French* is equally necessary to them, and more in our Power, and both are a Security in our Hands, that we could not have had without restoring them, though the same use that has rendered both necessary, would furnish both People with Expedients in lieu of them.

I do not therefore deny, that the almost total loss of this Trade, and of the Fishery, were among the Causes that most distressed our late Enemies, and induced them to Peace: On the contrary, I am therefore glad they were relieved from this Distress, while it was in full force, and before they had yet discovered, they could do without them; they certainly can do without them, and *France* has never been so formidable to us since the Establishment

blishment of her Colonies, as she was before; since she changed a great part of her Manufactories, which gave her a manifest Superiority in Wealth and Population, and consequently in Revenue, over every part of *Europe*, for a Foreign Trade, that has subjected her to the superiority of *Britain*, and has laid her open to Wounds we could not have given her in any other Quarter.

Surely, while we remain possessed of the indisputable Superiority at Sea, which we now have, and are likely to hold, every Possession, disjoined by the Sea from *France* and *Spain*, is a Pledge for their good Behaviour, because at least liable to be rendered of less Value, by a War with *Great Britain*; and however desirable such Possessions may be in the Eyes of the Mercantile People, and Financiers of those Kingdoms, they certainly render them relatively less powerful. *

In a Word, what have *France* and *Spain* to gain by a War with us, and what have they to lose? They are little likely to make any Conquests on us, in any part of the World, with Fleets much inferior

* A Minute Examination of the History of the War, carried on between the United Provinces, and the Crown of *Spain*, from the first Sea Expedition of the *Count de la Marck*, and the Surprise of the *Brille*, to the Treaty of *Munster*, will incline any impartial Man to believe it to be much more than probable, that Republick had never existed, at most had never been able long to resist the Efforts of *Spain*, had it not been for the Trade and distant Possessions of that Crown. I prefer this Instance to an Hundred I might make use of, because it is that of the most powerful Prince, possessed of the best Army, and commanded by the ablest Officers in *Europe*, baffled by Strength so remarkably relative, and that too, by those who had so lately been his own Subjects. I cannot help adding an Observation on the desire every State in *Europe*, especially those who are themselves the most formidable at Sea, have to keep Peace with the States of *Barbary*, only because they have no Trade nor Foreign Possession.

rior to that we have still on Foot; they are likely to lose every thing they gained by the Peace, should we think it worth our while to attempt the Reconquest of them; and let it not be said, that the Reconquest will cost us dear; we know enough of those Places now, to have reason to believe, that the keeping Possession of them would have cost us more, both of Men and Treasure, than their Reconquest would do. We have, thank God, the same brave Officers who reduced them, and whatever Strength the *Spaniards* may have added at the *Havannah*, on the Side of the *Moro*, I am assured, it is incapable of being rendered difficult to be taken on the Town Side.

But perhaps we may do better than attempt a Reconquest, we may profit by the Experience we have so dearly bought; we may at length have found out, that Wars in these Days are seldom terminated by Conquest, and may conclude, that to obstruct and possess ourselves of the Trade of the Enemy, will be a more eligible, and infinitely more profitable Method of carrying on the War, than to make Conquests that ease the Enemy of a Burthen, which we then take on our own Shoulders; and let it not be supposed, that the Possession of the Places we ceded by the late Peace, is essentially necessary to those Crowns; recent Experience has shewn, that *Spain* can bring home its Treasures, if not stopped by a superior Force at Sea, directly from the South Seas, and that nothing is more profitable in time of War, to the *French* Possessors of Plantations, in *Martinique* and *Guadalupe*, than to have those Islands protected by *British* Garrisons, from the force of our own Power, while nothing-else can protect the Trade of either People, from the Superiority of our Fleets;

Fleets; to which let me add; that the Price of our Stocks in a former *Spanish* War, while it was carried on at Sea only, furnishes us with reason to believe, that the Nation will never be distressed by a War so carried on.

To preserve this Superiority, the Parliament has wisely provided for a Sea Force more respectable than usual in time of Peace. Had such an Establishment of the Navy been preferred after the Peace of *Aix la Chapelle* to one of half the number, we probably had never been forced into the late War, by the numberless Violations of the Peace preceding it, and which even commenced in *America* with it; nor should we have begun that War with the indelible Disgrace of losing *Minorca*. I am sure no one who remembers the Commencement of that War will pretend, *that Seamen are always ready at hand when a War breaks out, or that we run no risque by a moderate Provision for the Sea Service*; it is well known that Seamen dismissed from the public Service do not always still continue Sailors in the Merchants Service; on the contrary, many Thousands are always lost by taking to the Land Employments from whence they came, by Debauchery for want of Employment, and by entering into the Service of foreign Princes; it is true, many Thousands too find Employment in the Merchants Service; but it is equally true, that they are not on an Emergency to be come at; that the necessary Practice of Pressing is a tedious as well as odious Resource, and that in the mean time our Trade suffers doubly†, and the Enemy if not superiour at Sea, are

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† Perhaps the Loss our Trade usually sustains from an Enemy at the Beginning of a War, is much less than it suffers from the Consequences of a general Impress of Seamen, which
not

at least able to contend for a temporary and partial Superiority at the beginning of a War, that frequently has prevented our putting a speedy end to it.

How much the Revenue has been improved by the Smuggling Cutters, I will not take on myself to say; that the Produce of the Customs in the last Year has exceeded that of the preceding one by 391,000 *l.* is not denied; nor can it be denied with Candour, that probably great part of this Increase has arisen from the Wisdom of this Measure, and the Vigilance of the Officers employed in it; and if the whole of this Improvement is not to be carried to the Account of the Cutters on the Head of Customs, it is to be considered, that the Utility of the Cutters is not confined to the Customs; many thousand Pounds being added to the Excise by a Stop or Obstruction to the smuggling Trade; but as the Public Credit depends no ways on the Refutation of this Cavil, I shall spend no more time on it.

But the Charge our Author introduces with this Cavil is of more Importance, because every Man concerned in the Preservation of Public Credit, is alarmed when he is told unreasonable and unusual Liberties are taken in the Application of the Sinking Fund, and much more, when it is insinuated, that the Fund itself is in Danger, and likely to be annihilated.

When the Fundholders are given to understand, that they have no Reason to believe their Principal will ever be paid, and that their Interest will be in peril the first War we are obliged to undertake,

not only deprives the Merchant Ships of the Seamen forced into the King's Service, but occasions almost all the rest to conceal themselves.

and

and that in short their Security is become scanty, it is high time, for the sake both of the Publick, and of the Creditor, to search into the Foundation on which this is thrown out, that we may foresee our Misfortunes, and provide ourselves at least with Patience to bear them. I well know there are many Fundholders more able to do this than myself, but as they do not seem willing to undertake the Task, I shall venture on an Examination of what this ingenious Author has advanced, and heartily wish to be set right if I err, either in the Examination, or in what I shall add to it; if I am wrong, I write to be better informed, and by being so, I shall attain my end, which is but to come to a true Conclusion, for the use of myself and my Readers.

Though I do not pretend to have had lying by me many Years Averages of the Produce of Duties granted Two or Three Years ago, I have some Materials, the Authenticity of which will be, I believe, as little doubted, having been laid before the House of Commons, where they are accessible to every body; perhaps too they are rather less liable to Error, than the Author's numerous Averages, and these may throw some additional Light on the Subject of our Enquiry.

But to make Use first of his Materials; the old Surpluses, the Consolidated Duties, and the Sum brought from the Supplies of 1764, amount, as he has made up the Total, to 4,548,000*l*. The actual charge on this Sum, that will incur before the 10th of *October* next, is 2,716,979*l*. so that the Sinking Fund, if the Author's Averages and Computations founded on them, be right, will have paid by that Day, the 2,000,000*l*. for which it is granted, within 283,021*l*.; this cannot be denied, whereas

in former Years, it has frequently not cleared the Charge upon it, by Sums abundantly larger; and particularly on the 10th of *October*, 1761, it was 965,160*l.* behind hand, and in the Year preceding, no less than 1,499,561*l.* Is this true, or is it not? And if it be, why is the incurring the Chance of such a Deficiency imputed as a Crime to the present Minister, or insisted on as a Symptom of Danger to Public Credit?

But this is not the only Crime imputed to him; that every one of his Predecessors have been almost every Year guilty of without Accusation: Was it that they gave fairer Play to their Adversaries, and laid themselves open on more important and solid Subjects of Blame? He is charged too with a Piece of Ministerial Craft, in Consolidating the Beer Duty with the Sinking Fund, from Christmas last, a piece of Craft practised by every Minister in Office, at the time of every Consolidation, and unavoidable where the Annuity charged on the Fund is payable at *Christmas* and *Midsummer*, from the course of making up the *Sinking Fund Account* to the 10th of *October*, and must have been the same in Effect, had the Consolidation taken place from the 5th of *April*, or the 5th of *July*: for in that Case the Produce of this Duty, between the 5th of *July*, and 10th of *October*, would necessarily have made part of the Sinking Fund on that Day, because no Charge would have incurred upon it; and yet after all, in Case the Deficiency should really prove to be 400,000*l.* whereas it is much more likely to be nothing at all, this is little more than One-Fourth part of what we have seen it amount to in a late Year.

But not to insist on this pretended unfair Advantage, which if it be an Advantage, it was impossible

possible to strip the Sinking Fund of, and to quit for a Moment our Author's Materials, for others I hope as good : It appears from the Papers laid before the House of Commons, that the disposeable Money produced by the intire Sinking Fund, composed of all it's parts at the respective times of laying those Accounts before the House, has been in the Year

	£.	s.	d.
1758—	1,924,900	9	10
1759—	1,689,097	2	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
1760—	2,411,072	0	0 $\frac{1}{2}$
1761—	2,296,801	5	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1762—	1,922,312	3	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
1763—	1,984,244	4	6 $\frac{1}{4}$
	<u>12,228,427</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4$\frac{1}{4}$</u>

Which being reduced by a Deduction of the Land Tax 1758, the Spirit Duties arising before the Annuities charged on them commenced, and of the Sum of 93,371*l.* 11*s.* remaining of the Sinking Fund, 1757, unappropriated and carried to the Credit of 1758 ; there will remain the Sum of 11,513,408*l.* To which must be added the Sum of Half a Year's Interest of Navy Bills, and * Deficiencies paid out of the Sinking Fund, 1763.

147,593

11,661,001

And

• It is necessary to restore this Interest, and these Deficiencies to the Sinking Fund, because the Business here is to compute the Average gross Produce of the Sinking Fund after Payment of the Interest of that part of the Funded Debt that is charged upon the Duties, the surplusses of which compose the Sinking Fund, and subject to the Payment, as well of the temporary Charge upon it, as of the Debt and Interest thereon, for which it stands a collateral Security, both which are from time to time replaced by Parliament ; for this gross Produce, although so Subject,

And the above Sum of 11,661,001*l.* being divided by Six, will produce 1,943,500*l.* which is the true Average Produce of all the Surplusses called *the Sinking Fund*, upon a Period of the last Six Years, and which I must suppose it will produce in the course of the Current Year, as well as in every future Year, unless some Reason can be assigned for the difference. †

This Sum of 1,943,500*l.* is properly the Sinking Fund, after Payment of the Interest of the whole Funded Debt, and will be the Foundation of subsequent Calculations, but to discover how much of it will be actually applicable to the Discharge of 2,000,000*l.* charged upon the Sinking Fund of the present Year, and what Arrear we may from this Calculation expect, will be left for the Sinking Fund of next Year to pay; we are first to add

jeft, is what is properly in Parliamentary Language called the Sinking Fund, and from this we shall afterwards deduct the certain, as well as casual Charges.

† It does not appear to me on the most careful Examination, that any Funds incorporated with the Sinking Fund, since the first Year of the above Period, can lessen that Fund, or give us any room to entertain Fears of it's being less for the future than the above Average: On the contrary, there are many reasonable Prospects of considerable Additions to it; the Author of the *Budget* allows the last Duty on Beer to produce 522,000*l.* per Annum, the clear Produce of the Year to *Midsummer* last, was 526,000*l.* whereas the Charge incurred on the Sinking Fund, by this Consolidation, is but 496,000*l.* this adds at least 26,000*l.* per Annum to the Sinking Fund. The improvement of the Regulation of Franking was, I am informed, 1000*l.* the first Week, at this Rate we may expect a large Addition to the Post Office Revenue; it is uncandid to deny that great Attention has been paid to the Customs, and that Improvements are to be expected on that Branch, and there are near 100,000*l.* a Year paid to Annuitants for Life, some of which drop in every Year, and one of which, of 500*l.* a Year, fell in a few Months ago.

from

from the Supply of the Year 147,593 *l.* making the Sum of 2,091,003 *l.* from which we are to deduct what remained on the 10th of *October* 1763, unpaid of the former Charge of the Sinking Fund - - - - - 67,823

A Year's Interest of the Navy Annuities 139,342

Deficiencies of Funds 1758 and 1763 } 100,000
computed at - - - - -

307,165

which being deducted leaves 1,783,928 *l.* which will leave unpaid but 216,072 *l.* and it will be further reduced by the pretended Piece of ministerial Craft to the Sum of 92,072 *l.* for this Sum of 124000 *l.* it is admitted by our Author, must be carried to the Account of the Sinking Fund, and will not be wanted for, nor capable of being applied to any other Use.

But this part of his Subject the Writer of the *Budget* does not dismiss, without another Bugbear; we are terrified with a Deficiency, he has the Moderation not to bring to Account, on the Civil List; we are told this will probably reduce the Aggregate Fund 7000 *l.* a Year, by it's Consolidation with it, and this Conjecture is founded on an Average taken through the whole Reign of the late King; but in taking this Average, no regard is had to the immense Increase of every species of Trade and Business in this Kingdom, charged with the Duties that compose this Revenue; this Increase is manifest to every curious and candid Inquirer; and though it be objected, that the Reduction of some of these Duties, by the Effect of subsequent Duties, both of Excise and Impost, may be reasonably feared, it is certain that those subsequent Duties had not, at the Death of his late Majesty, yet counteracted the Increase

crease arising from our improved Trade and inland Consumption, for the Produce of the Ten last Years of his late Majesty's Reign, were

	£.	s.	d.
In the Year 1751—	812,299	6	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
1752—	791,405	16	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
1753—	834,443	9	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
1754—	831,810	0	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
1755—	823,824	14	0 $\frac{1}{2}$
1756—	852,702	11	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
1757—	772,794	4	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
1758—	810,404	7	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
1759—	832,886	3	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
1760—	876,988	5	9 $\frac{1}{2}$
In the whole	8,239,559	1	2 $\frac{1}{2}$

that is, in each Year 823,955*l.* and this carries Demonstration that the subsequent Duties have not impaired this Branch of Revenue, but that on the contrary, an Addition may be fairly expected to the Sinking Fund, from the Acquisition of this Revenue, independent of a multitude of Improvements it will open the Door to, and which were before excluded, by the separation of the Civil List Branches from the rest.

I am next to consider, whether the future disposable Money arising from the Sinking Fund, will be more or less than 1,271,165*l.* as our Author has stated it, and to endeavour to come at the real State of the Net Income and Outgoings of the Public.

And First, from the Materials he has furnished us with, as far as it is possible, with any regard to Truth to build upon them.

The Average Produce of Surplusses and Consolidated Duties is 4,029,727*l.* exclusive of the Beer Duty, 1761.

Thus

Thus

The Surplusses of the old Branches, 1,938,727
 New Consolidated Duties including }
 372,000*l.* which he has added for } 2,463,000
 the Beer Duty 1761 }

4,401,727

Deduct the Beer Duty added by our }
 Author, because I shall add the } 372,000
 Annual Produce }

4,029,727

And adding the intire annual Pro- }
 duce he allows for the Beer Duty, } 522,000
communibus Annis }

We have 4,551,727

for the gross Produce of the Sinking Fund *com-*
munibus Annis, subject to the Interest of what we may
 call the New Stocks of consolidated Annuities,
 which now, including the Navy Annuities, and
 Annuities 1761, amount to 2,911,198. Thus

Consolidated Annuities at 3 *per Cent.* 643,556

Reduced ————— 540,994

Consolidated 4 *per Cents* ————— 814,234

Long Annuities ————— 121,680

Three and a half *per Cent.* 1756 53,342

South-Sea 1751 ————— 64,180

Life Annuities 1757 ————— 35,212

Navy Annuities ————— 140,000

Three *per Cent.* and long Annuities 1761 496,000

 2,911,198

Deduct 4,551,727
 2,911,198

Remains 1,640,529 Which,

supposing the aggregate Fund neither gets nor
 loses by the Civil List, is the net Produce to be
 expected from the Sinking Fund from his own Ma-
 terials, subject only to the Deficiency of the Funds

D 1758

1758 and 1763, which he has estimated at 100,000*l.* a Year.

Of that Part of the unfunded Debt, which is not charged on the Sinking Fund, called by our Author 6,000,000*l.* (and which perhaps is not far wide of the Truth, except that near 1,000,000*l.* consisting of Arrears of Pay, some from the time of Queen *Anne*, will hardly ever be demanded, and may therefore be considered as reducing the Debt to Five Millions) neither the Residue of the *German* Demands, nor the last Six Months of the Navy Bills, nor any Part of those called Non-Interest Bills, nor of the Seamen's Pay, carry Interest, so that the Nation cannot be charged with more than the Interest of 3,000 000*l.* *i. e.* of 1,000,000*l.* Exchequer Bills, which are a Security to the Bank

800,000 <i>l.</i> issued to private Persons at	30,000
4 per Cent.	32,000

* There are about 1,500,000 Navy and Victualling Bills beyond Six Months, of which at most 1,200,000 on Interest - 48,000

Total 110,000

Which though it be no Charge upon the Sinking Fund, but must be paid out of the future Supplies from Year to Year; yet to pursue our Author's Method, and because it is certain this Interest until its Principal be discharged, is a Diminution of the public Revenue, I shall, as he has done, deduct from the Sinking Fund, because as it must finally come out

of

* This was wrote some Months ago; since which time, the Navy Debt for Bills registered in course must have increased; but as it has diminished as much on the head of Seamen's Pay, this Circumstance makes no material difference, except that the Interest payable by the Public is somewhat encreased, and if this small addition of weight be not removed before it is felt, I shall be ready to allow it in the Account.

of some Part of the public Income ; it is
the same Thing in the End, at what time
the Deduction is made,

Add Deficiency of Funds 1758 and	110,000
1762	100,000
	10,000

deduct this from the above Surplus of 1,640,529
210,000

Leaves 1,430,529

which according to the Author's own Account is what
may be expected for future disposeable Money ap-
plicable to pay Part of the Public Debt, or to
the current Service, over and above what is re-
placed to the Sinking Fund every year.

But every Stockholder, and I may say, every
Englishman, is so much interested in the Truth of
this Conclusion ; and its Consequences are so ex-
tensive and important, that I am desirous of esta-
blishing the Credit of the Sinking Fund by such
Trials as may prove that I have not stated it here
too high.

I have proved from Papers laid before Parlia-
ment that the Average Produce of the gross Sink-
ing Fund for Six Years last has been 1,943,500*l.*
subject to such Charges as are however made good
out of the Supplies of the following Year, *i. e.* the
Navy Annuities and Deficiencies of Funds, of
which the former being deducted

1,943,500
140,000

leaves—1,803,500, From this
Deduct as above 210,000*l.* the Residue is
D 2 1,593,500*l.*

1,593,500*l.* * Money applicable either for the Current Service or to pay the unfunded, and afterwards the funded Debt, and which we have reason to believe will be sufficient, not only to compleat the Sum of 2,000,000*l.* granted out of the Sinking Fund for the Service of 1764, but with the Land and Malt, support the Expence of an ordinary Peace Establishment; and besides, to discharge the Residue of the *German* Demands.

To give some further Confirmation to this Estimate, I have now before me an Account of the net Produce of the Excise, actually paid into the Exchequer, between 5th of *July*, 1763, and 5th *July*, 1764, the Amount, exclusive of the Annual Malt, has been ———— 4,191,731

Customs estimated, as by the Author, } 2,000,000
at ————

Petty Branches at ———— 1,000,000

————— 7,191,731
Deduct Civil List and Interest of the }
Debt ———— 5,487,000

—————
Remains — 1,704,731
for future Sinking Fund, from whence, deducting the Interest of the Unfunded Debt, which, tho'

not

* It is to follow our Author, that I have at once deducted from the Sinking Fund these two Sums of 100,000 for the Deficiencies of the Funds, 58 and 61, and 110,000*l.* for the Interest of that Part of the unfunded Debt, that is not charged on the Sinking Fund, because I think no Error is so dangerous as those we may be led into by a Reliance on this plausible Writer, who is either very uncandid, or, as I hope, very inaccurate; the deduction of the Interest of the Unfunded Debt, not a Charge on the Sinking Fund, is, however, improper; so that the Gross Sinking Fund, subject to Charges, is 1,943,500*l.* the Clear Sinking Fund, exclusive of what is constantly made good to it, out of the subsequent Year, will be 1,704,158*l.* but I chuse to make use of the Sum of 1,594,158*l.* in order to detect an Inaccuracy in the Budget, of the utmost Consequence;

the

not properly to be deducted from this Fund, must certainly be paid out of some Part of the Revenue, there remains the Sum of —1,594,731*l*.

Thus 1,704,731
 110,000

1,594,731

This Confirmation will, perhaps, put it out of doubt that we may safely estimate the future applicable Money arising from the Sinking Fund, over and above the Interest of the whole Funded and Unfunded Debt, and clear of all Deficiencies, and besides what is brought to the Sinking Fund from the Supplies of the Year, at about 1,600,000*l*. without the Danger of any considerable Error; but as we have great Reason to hope that the Unfunded Debt will not long remain a Burthen on us; when that time comes, the clear disposeable Money of the Sinking Fund will become over and above every annual Charge on the Revenue, at least 1,700,000*l*. exclusive of such Improvements as may be reasonably hoped for, from the Regulations of Franking, the Deaths of Annuitants for life; the Improvement of the Customs, &c.

And after all, I sincerely believe, that even this Sum is considerably too low; I am satisfied that I am short of the Truth, exclusive of the future Improvements of the Public Revenue that I have mentioned; the Papers laid before Parliament next Session will determine how far I am right in my

the Author is pleased to say, that the avowed Peace Establishment is 3,600,000*l*. does he seriously mean that the Estimates, exclusive of Deficiencies, will amount to this? if he does not, he is surely guilty of great Inaccuracy; wilful or not, I leave the Reader to judge, in adding the Deficiencies and Interest of the Unfunded Debt to the Current Service, and yet deducting them from the Ways and Means.

Conjecture,

Conjecture; and whose Calculations are most to be depended on for the State of the Revenue of the Nation, the Author of the *Budget's* or mine.

And now let us see what Merit the Ministry have with the Landed Interest; they have brought them to a Prospect of a Reduction of the Land Tax within a few Years; a Prospect out of sight, when the War continued: and in the mean time the Landed Man of Sense knows that as his Fate is not *hopeless*, so burthened as he is, his Situation is better than if an Addition had been made to the Excise or Customs.

The wisest Financiers have laid it down as a Rule, that the Land pays every Tax: I think Mr. *Lock's* Words are, "The Trader will not pay them, the Labouring Man cannot, the Landed Man must." In short, it is demonstrable, that those who possess an Income, that does not arise from Labour, or Ingenuity and Skill, and which in its Nature is not to be carried away, will directly, or indirectly, suffer for every Tax imposed; and if he fancies he has found out a Method of transferring those Taxes to another, if the Burthen be considerable, 'tis twenty to one, but that other runs away, and leaves the Landed Man to pay the Tax, with less Ability to bear it.

The Ministry have then the Merit with the Landed Interest of bringing into Prospect that Reduction, which a Year or two more of War would have carried quite out of sight; and they the Merit of making this Reduction probable, without adding to the indirect Load the Land is already burthened with.

I am far from thinking this Nation is incapable of bearing further Taxes; it has certainly various Resources; but some of them may be hazardous,
and

and all ought to be reserved for times when Necessity requires them : It is ridiculous to argue, that new Taxes should be laid now, because such were laid in the last War, and in that which preceded the Peace of *Aix la Chapelle* ; and it ill becomes the Friends of them, who made that Peace, which is only to be justified by the Difficulty of raising Money, to insist that many Resources remained even at that time.

That the Prospect of reducing the Land-tax is not vain, will appear from hence.

The avowed ordinary Peace Establishment, exclusive of Deficiencies, is about 2,900,000*l.* * and not 3,600,000*l.* and even this Sum is subject to Reductions, that it may be reasonably hoped will very shortly take Place, and in a few Years, amount to 2, or 300,000*l.*

A Plan for a Revenue, to be collected in the Plantations, has been laid, and in Part, put into Execution ; it is yet too early to say, what may probably be expected from this Plan ; but I have been assured, that when Experience has enabled us to give a little more Perfection to it, a large Sum, perhaps 150,000*l.* a Year may be produced by it : The Half-pay Estimate must diminish every

* Any one that will take the Pains to examine the Supplies of the last Year will see that this Sum is not mentioned at Random, but that it is the full Amount of the permanent Establishment of the Army and Navy, even including the heavy Estimates of *Chelsea* Hospital and Half-pay, together with the Foundling Hospital, *African* Forts, and other Estimates that are like to continue exclusive only of the occasional and incidental Matters that are elsewhere considered, and of the Deficiencies of Funds, which the author of the *Budget* has deducted as I have from the Funds themselves. And this I think cannot be deemed an unfair way of estimating what may be called an ordinary Peace Establishment.

Day, and diminish the Estimates of the Current Service; and in like Manner the falling in of Exchequer Annuities, will yield a considerable yearly Increase to the Sinking Fund: The Expence of *Chelsea Hospital*, for the same Reason, is a decreasing Expence, never very great, but at the Close of a War; and that of the *Foundling Hospital* will probably be greatly lessened the Year after next, and be saved within two or three Years afterwards; I might, therefore, without Danger of being mistaken, compute the Peace Establishment, for future Years, much below 2,900,000*l*.

In the mean time, the Land and Malt will produce net, about ————— 2,450,000

The Sinking Fund nearly clear ————— 1,600,000

————— 4,050,000

Deduct an ordinary Peace Establishment } ————— 2,900,000

————— 1,150,000

This is of itself probably more than sufficient to pay the Remainder of the *German Demands*; and in four or five Years, to discharge the whole Unfunded Debt †.

If an Occasional Subsidy, or a Fleet of Observation, or a Variety of Incidental Matters, that must occur in the most peaceable Times, should postpone the Pay-

† It is a material consideration for those who have so confidently reported that we are never to expect 3 *per Cent.* at par again, that this Sum of 1,150,000*l*. is not only greatly beyond what was applicable out of the Sinking Funds in the Years 1749, 50, and 51, for the Payment of the National Debt, but is nearly equal to the gross Sinking Fund itself in those Years; and yet 3 *per Cent.* Annuities were at par a little more or less throughout those Years, notwithstanding the Load of unsubscribed Annuities to be provided for.

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ment of any Part of this outstanding Debt, which is (exclusive of old Arrears of Pay, and the six Months of Navy Bills, not come into Course of Payment) about 4,000,000*l.* and not 6,000,000*l.* it may be six, or it may be seven Years, before the Unfunded Debt is cleared. I would not be understood to say such Contingencies any more than the *Indian War*, are comprized in the Sum of 2,900,000*l.* but it is to be considered that with an Establishment of 16,000 Seamen, with our Militia, and less Attachment to the Continent than we have heretofore unhappily had, these incidental Matters are less likely to occur; and when they do, perhaps the Alarm may cost us little; and if they do not, the Unfunded Debt is to be discharged sooner.

And here I might conclude my Subject, as I think I have shewn that National Credit stands on a much better Foundation, and that the Prospect of the Public Creditors is much more promising than has been represented by our Author, who has exerted a great deal of Ability and Ingenuity, to lessen the one, and to alarm the others; but as Public Credit is certainly the better or the worse, for the Reputation of the Persons intrusted with the Administration of Public Affairs, I cannot but congratulate the Stockholders on the forced Confession of our Author, that the present Administration is acceptable to the Landed Gentry of the Kingdom*; he cannot conceal the Spleen and Concern this Circumstance gives him, and they extort this Confession from him, tho' it con-

* That neither the Administration nor the Peace are unacceptable to the trading Part of Mankind, I may infer from the Memorable Address on that Occasion, signed by the greatest Number of opulent Merchants and Traders that ever signified their Approbation of any public Measure.

tains the fullest Justification of those he takes so much Pains to traduce. There may have been, and I believe have been, Ministers in every Country that have been able and honest, and have yet been unpopular among the Proprietors of Land; but I think the Author can hardly point out an instance in any Age, or any Country, where the Opinion of the Proprietors of Land was corrupted in favour of a weak or wicked Ministry. For my own Part, I shall always think that when Power is placed in the Hands approved by a Majority of Landed Men of this, or any other Country, it stands upon its right Basis, and neither can, nor ought to be shaken; the Landed Man ought to be, and generally is, by his Education, most able to judge on the Subject, and has no other Bias than the Good of his Country, which his strongest Interests prompt him to uphold, and when Power is supported by Property, the Subjects have the only Security the Nature of Government will admit of, for its due Exercise, and the only Security to be relied on. When Power is separated from Property, the Constitution becomes corrupted, and every Day approaches that Dissolution, which Events may procrastinate, but cannot long prevent.



F I N I S